4.1 Study Area
4.2 Acquisition of critical infrastructure Data sets
4.3 Acquisition of Insurgency (Fatalities) Data sets
4.4 Hotspots Analysis of vulnerable Zones of Critical Infrastructure
4.5 Overlay Analysis of Critical Infrastructure on Vulnerable Zones
5.1 Fatalities Analysis
5.2 Number of Displace People in IDP Camps
5.3 Terrorist attacked locations
5.4 Insurgency Hotspots map
5.5 Vulnerable Zones
5.6 Infrastructures in vulnerable zone
5.6.1 Health facilities in vulnerable zones
5.6.2 Market in vulnerable zone
5.6.3 Schools in Vulnerable Zone
5.6.4 Settlement in Vulnerable zones
5.6.5 Infrastructures in vulnerable zones
5.6.6 Cropland within the vulnerable region


The aim of this research is to assess the vulnerability (its level of attack) on critical infrastructure in the North East, Nigeria. Its specific objectives are:

  1. Identification of critical infrastructure
  2. Vulnerability assessment of critical infrastructure

The rest of the paper is organized in four (4) sections:

Section 1 provides a brief background/introduction of the terms “vulnerability”, “critical infrastructure”, The use of Remote Sensing and GIS based approach for Vulnerability Assessment of Critical Infrastructure will expose areas in the North East that are lacking these critical infrastructures and also helps in location where such infrastructures have been destroyed by insurgency, Terrorism the approaches and methodology, and results as obtained.

Section 2 provides the aims and stated objectives of the research.

Section 3 provides brief literature reviews of identified researches conducted in this regards, employing the use of remote sensing and GIS in tackling plethora of challenges faced as regards the protection of critical infrastructure. It also involved the identification of a research gap of needed contribution to the ongoing researches on vulnerability on critical infrastructures in Nigeria.

Section 4 provides a general description of the study area; the datasets employed in the duration of the research and the methodological approach as used in attaining the aim and stated objectives of this research.

Section 5 provides detailed data analysis, results presentation and discussion.

Section 6 provides the conclusion of the research paper and outlined recommendation (s).


Nigeria is one of Africa’s largest economies, yet for over a decade, it has struggled to address devastating jihadi insurgencies and terrorism by Boko Haram, security in the North-eastern Nigeria has significantly deteriorating since 2017. Vulnerability Assessment to critical infrastructure has not been adequately addressed in the North East. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to identify the critical infrastructure and vulnerability assessment using GIS based approach.

Vulnerability is defined as the relationship between a facility’s desirability as a target and the level of deterrent and/or defense provided by existing countermeasures. The function and/or symbolic relevance of the facility determine target attractiveness, which is a measure of the asset or facility in the eyes of an attacker. Vulnerability means different things to different people and the term is often confused with risk. Buckel (2000) contends that work must be done to clear up the definition of vulnerability with respect to risk. For example, Emergency Management Australia (1998) defines vulnerability as the degree of susceptibility and resilience of the community and environment to hazards. Likewise, the Emergency Management Australia (1998) glossary of terms interchanges the terms vulnerability analysis with hazard analysis or vulnerability assessment. National Water Resources Association (NWRA) (2002) defines a vulnerability assessment as the identification of weaknesses in security, focusing on defined threats that could compromise its ability to provide a service. Blaike et al. (p. 4, 1994) defines vulnerability as “the characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard”.

“Critical infrastructure” consists of systems and assets so vital to the whole community that their incapacity would harm the physical community security, economic security or public health. Critical infrastructure is often geographically concentrated, so it may be distinctly vulnerable to events like natural disasters, epidemics, and certain kinds of terrorist attacks. Throughout this research, the concept of vulnerability and processes for assessment in critical infrastructures due to a security threat. In order to investigate the vulnerability of a system and to get informative answers it is necessary to raise the questions: “Why is the system vulnerable?”, “What is it vulnerable to?”, “How vulnerable is it?” and “Where is the vulnerability located?” (Turner et al 2003). The answers provided can be useful for strengthening the resilience of a system and thus reducing the vulnerability (Semadeni-Davis et al 2007; Mossberg-Sonnek et al. 2007; Vogel et al. 2007; Adger 1999).

All facilities are exposed to a certain level of risk from a variety of threats. These dangers could arise as a result of natural disasters, accidents, or malicious activities. Regardless of the nature of the hazard, facility owners must restrict or manage the risks posed by these threats to the greatest extent practicable. The vulnerability assessment examines both the potential loss from a successful attack and the facility’s/vulnerability locations to an assault. The degree to which a successful attack from a given danger compromises the agency’s mission is known as the impact of loss. The accurate definition of the ratings for impact of loss and vulnerability is an important part of the vulnerability assessment. These definitions may differ significantly from one facility to the next. The length of time that mission capability is harmed, for example, is a significant factor in the impact of loss.

Critical infrastructure (CI) can be harmed in a variety of ways, including natural (e.g., flooding) and manmade (e.g., earthquakes) (e.g., accident, robbery, terrorist attack). Their impacts can range from little disruption to catastrophic catastrophe, depending on whether they affect infrastructure or, as a result of a domino effect, multiple other key sectors (Security and Forensic Sciences, 2016). Terrorist attacks involving explosive devices warrant special attention since they can occur in a variety of ways, and while another type of threat may emerge in the future, it has historically been one of the most regularly used techniques by terrorists. Critical infrastructure may include communications; emergency services; energy; dams; finance; food; public services; industry; health; transport; gas; public communications, radio and television; information technology; commercial facilities; chemical and nuclear sectors; and water.

The use of Remote Sensing and GIS based approach for Vulnerability Assessment of Critical Infrastructure will expose areas in the North East that are lacking these critical infrastructures and also help in location where such infrastructures have been destroyed by insurgency, Terrorism. Certain types of terrorist attacks could be of sufficient scale to pose a geographic threat to critical infrastructure. Nuclear bombs, radiological weapons (“dirty” bombs), or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) devices could damage or render Inaccessible concentrated critical assets. Cyber-attacks on regional computer systems also have the potential to damage or disrupt computer networks’ ability to control critical infrastructure. Biological attacks could have impacts similar to those of epidemics, although they could be more specifically targeted at particular regions.


The aim of this research is to assess the vulnerability (its level of attack) on critical infrastructure in the North East, Nigeria. The objectives of this research are as follows:

  1. Identification of critical infrastructure
  2. Vulnerability assessment of critical infrastructure

SDG 1: NO POVERTY: To eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than $1.25 a day. To ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and vulnerable have equal rights to economic resources as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, etc.

SDG 2: ZERO HUNGER: Sustainable Development Goal 2 aims to achieve zero hunger. It is one of the 17 sustainable development goals established by the United Nations in 2015. The mission is to end hunger, achieve food security and improve nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture.

SDG 4: QUALITY EDUCATION: The goal is targeted at ensuring equal access for all men and women to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university.

SDG 11: SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES: This goal is aimed at ensuring access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, ensure access for all to adequate safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums.

SDG 16: PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS: To significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere, end abusive exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children.

4.1 Study Area

North-Eastern part of Nigeria lies between the vast arid expanse of the Sahara and the dense tropical rain forest along the Guinea Coast. Sharing boundaries with Cameroon on the east, Niger and Chad republics on the north, North-Central Nigeria on the west, and South-Eastern Nigeria on the south. This geographical area constitutes the largest zone in Nigeria and comprises of the present’s states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe since the state’s creation of 1996. It has a total of 103,639 square miles, representing 29.1 per cent of the total area of Nigeria.

The climate, however, is not different from that of the northern Nigeria. It has a definite rhythm of wet and dry seasons, to which the whole life of the zone is adjusted. The rainy season usually starts in April and last through September. At this period of the year the zone receives copious rain with Yola and Jalingo due to their comparatively heavy precipitation, and Mambila due to its comparatively high altitude having 41 inches.

Figure 1: Map showing the North Eastern States under study

Determining what constitutes “critical infrastructure” is nearly as difficult as defining “terrorism” in a way that is universally acceptable, given the ramifications of including and excluding certain services and businesses.

The United States’ Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience identified 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose “assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the country that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof,” according to the directive.

These are some of them: –

  1. Health care and public health
  2. Government facilities
  3. Commercial facilities that draw large crowds of people for shopping, business, entertainment, or lodging.
  4. Information systems that include, the internet for example, (the system and protecting the physical network as well as mobile and fixed telecommunication and satellites, also needed for navigation).
  5. Transportation to include all possible forms of transportation from road, rail, air (airplanes and airports, as well as air traffic), sea, and inland waterway transport.
  6. Energy (e.g., oil, gas, wind turbines, solar farms) that is needed in the production of electricity, its storage and distribution
  7. National monuments that are important in representing a country’s national identity as well as religious institutions with references to churches, mosques, and synagogues. Symbolism in attacking these facilities and the emotional reaction following an attack make it a favourable target in hate crimes (targeting only the facility) to severe incidents of hate crimes and acts of terrorism.
  8. National monuments
  9. Food and agriculture aimed at the production and delivery of food suitable for human consumption.
  10. Financial services with reference to banking and payment services.

In this study, data processing and analysis procedures follow these four steps discussed in their sequential order of operation. The steps are:

  1. Acquisition of critical infrastructure datasets.
  2. Acquisition of Insurgency (Fatalities) Data sets
  • Hotspots Analysis of vulnerable Zones of Critical Infrastructure
  1. Overlay Analysis of Critical Infrastructure on Vulnerable Zones
4.2 Acquisition of critical infrastructure Data sets 

Prior to its acquisition, the proposed methodology demanded extensive analyses on vital aspects within the North East Region which centres on its resources, urban planning, land-use planning, energy planning in physical and virtual infrastructure, and socio-economic and socio-cultural aspects amongst others

Data regarding these six categories need to be collected in GIS-based spatial data, since the analyses that are going to be conducted will utilize overlay analyses within GIS-based software. Thus, data sets were acquired from the GRID3 Nigeria portal. Figure 2 shows the data processing workflow. GRID3 (Geo-Referenced Infrastructure and Demographic Data for Development) works with countries to generate, validate and use geospatial data on population, settlements, infrastructure, and boundaries. GRID3 combines the expertise of partners in government, United Nations, academia, and the private sector to design adaptable and relevant geospatial solutions based on capacity and development needs of each country.

4.3 Acquisition of Insurgency (Fatalities) Data sets

Twelve years (2008-2020) of fatalities recorded at different event types inflicted by the activities of boko haram were acquired via the ACLED Database. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) is a disaggregated data collection, analysis, and crisis mapping project. ACLED collects the dates, actors, locations, fatalities, and types of all reported political violence and protest events across Africa, the Middle East, Latin America & the Caribbean, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia & the Caucasus, Europe, and the United States of America. The ACLED team conducts analysis to describe, explore, and test conflict scenarios, and makes both data and analysis open for free use by the public.

Figure 2: Methodological flow chat

4.4 Hotspots Analysis of vulnerable Zones of Critical Infrastructure

Hotspot maps had been developed and employed to identify vulnerable areas that would impact greatly on established critical infrastructure within the North East Region. Identification of hotspots is one of the foremost approaches employed in the course of this research. This research was to identify and rank the various vulnerable zones based on the Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) and hotspot analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*) methods. The KDE provides a vivid visualization of the hotspots and hotspot analysis, thus providing statistical significance of the hotspot terms in terms of Getis-Ord (Gi*) statistic. In this study, the North East region of Nigeria is considered as the study area for the application of KDE and Gi* methods for the identifying such vulnerable zones. Twelve years (2008-2020) of fatalities recorded at different event types inflicted by the activities of boko haram was analysed. Then, Hotspot Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*) is performed to test the statistical significance for hotspot locations identified from KDE. The statistically significant hotspots are then ranked based on the density estimate. The methodology could be applied for any study area including developing countries with sufficient accident data for hotspot identification and prioritization of actions to mitigating the attacks of boko haram on critical infrastructures within the region

4.5 Overlay Analysis of Critical Infrastructure on Vulnerable Zones 

An overlay analysis was conducted in order to realise the spatial weighted overlay and prioritize potential vulnerable areas impacting on the critical infrastructure within the North East Region. Throughout the whole process, the harmonization of critical infrastructure and vulnerable zones is targeted. Overlay analysis is a group of methodologies applied in optimal site selection or suitability modelling. It is a technique for applying a common scale of values to diverse and dissimilar inputs to create an integrated analysis. Spatial-based overlay analysis often requires the analysis of many different factors [Understanding Overlay Analyses, 2021].

5.1 Fatalities Analysis 

Figure 3: Actors and Fatalities

Over the twelve-year (2008-2020) of fatalities recorded at different event types caused by bokoharam was analyzed. These fatalities were classified into three event types; battles, explosion/Remote violence and violence against civilians and the year of occurrence are illustrated in figure 3. For every type of event there were fatalities. For battles event the highest fatalities occurred in 2012, followed by 2011 and 2020. Explosion/remote violence the highest fatalities occurred in 2012, followed by 2011 and 2020 (Figure 3).

Figure 4: Fatalities and hotspot map

Figure 4 shows the distribution of fatalities of insurgency across north eastern Nigeria.  Some areas have experienced more fatalities than others. As seen in the image, Borno state has the highest concentration of fatalities ranging from 143 – 400 deaths as represented on the map.

Since 2009, the catastrophic violence in north-eastern Nigeria has killed over 35,000 people as a result of insurgency. According to the UNDP, as of the end of 2020, Northeast Nigeria’s fight with Islamist insurgents had killed approximately 350,000 people (Kazeem, 2021). The figure, provided by the United Nations in a new research on the violence and its effects on livelihoods, is ten times larger than earlier estimates of around 35,000 people killed in Nigerian combat since the conflict began 12 years ago. As a result of these deaths, many have lost their bread winners leading to mass displacement to IDP camps.  Nigeria’s conflict with insurgents in West Africa Province has resulted in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with millions of people reliant on aid.

5.2 Number of Displace People in IDP Camps 

This section reveals the number of individuals in each camp across the north eastern state

Table 1:  Number of people in IDP Camps

Generally, there are 1,290,996 people in 2,075 IDP camps across 6 north-east of Nigeria. Adamawa state has the highest number of camps followed by Borno and the lowest is Taraba state. Borno state has highest number of people living in the camp followed by Adamawa and lowest is Gombe State (Table 1).

Figure 5: Number of displaced person and Hotspot map

Figure 5 shows the number of displaced persons as a result of insurgency across north-eastern Nigeria. The pink dotted areas which constitutes the largest number of displaced persons ranging from 534 – 43854 is largely concentrated in Borno state, this is followed by places marked by yellow ranging from 199 – 533 persons displaced.

According to UNDP report on assessing the Impact of Conflict on Development in North-East Nigeria, violence is the leading cause of forced migration (UNDP, 2021). In many cases, wars generate more refugees (those forced to flee the country) than internally displaced people (IDPs). Forced migration patterns are frequently determined by a complex web of factors such as policy, ease of movement, and economic considerations.  Forced migration is frequently prolonged or even permanent. The report also highlighted that Boko Haram attacks have resulted in widespread internal displacement. More than 1.8 million Nigerians have been displaced in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, with Borno hosting the vast majority (nearly 1.5 million). IDPs frequently live in deplorable conditions and lack access to adequate food and services in camps and host communities.

5.3 Terrorist attacked locations

Figure 6: Terrorist Attack location map

From figure 6 majority of the incidents happened in Borno state close to Chad border. The attacks were carried out mainly in villages or along the main roads. Areas away from the villages and roads didn’t have any incidents.

5.4 Insurgency Hotspots map

Figure 7: Insurgency Hotspots map

Figure 7 shows the insurgency hotspots, highlighting specific locations where the attacks were carried out over a period of 11 years. From what is seen in the image, the highest number of insurgency attacks were clustered around the Adamawa/Borno boundary, while other areas like Maiduguri, Konduga and Yobe also experienced heavy attacks.

Insurgent attacks have also resulted in massive internal displacement. More than 1.8 million Nigerians have been displaced in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, with Borno hosting the vast majority (nearly 1.5 million). Furthermore, 1.8 million students were out of school in 2020, this is according to UNDP report, and if development efforts are not increased, the average Nigerian in the north-east will have lost a full year of education by 2030 (UNDP, 2021).

Figure 8: Hotspot map

Figure 8 depict changes in the activities of Boko haram between 2010-2020.  The map to the left shows their activities from 2010-2015 and to the right indicated between 2015-2020. The hotpot areas where identified by computing the kennel Density statistic whose results are given by the hotspot confidence levels of high and low. The high hotspots are fund in Borno and Chad border and depicted in figure 7. Comparing left and right maps it reveals that, the insurgency activities are more severe in 2010-2015, however there is decline in their activities between 2015-2020. This reduction was hold to the intensification of security effort in the period under review.

5.5 Vulnerable Zones

Figure 9: Vulnerable Zone map

The entire North-East was profiled into 2 risk zones as shown in figure 9 The high-risk zones are in red which are concentrated in Borno state and the low zone are in yellow.

5.6 Infrastructures in vulnerable zone 
5.6.1 Health facilities in vulnerable zones

Figure 10 Health facilities in vulnerable zone map

Figure 10 shows that, the majority of health facilities in Borno, Yobe, and Gombe state falls within the high vulnerable areas which make them to be susceptible to attack by insurgence, however is only in Adamawa, Taraba and Bauchi states that, majority of the health facilities falls in low vulnerable regions.

5.6.2 Market in vulnerable zone 

Figure 11: Market in vulnerable zone

Figure 11 shows the market areas that fall within the vulnerable zones. The places captured in red colour are places with high vulnerability, while places with yellow are the market areas with low vulnerability. Again, Borno state has the highest concentration of highly vulnerable areas, as well as the boundary between Adamawa and Borno state.

The insurgency has severely disrupted economic activity through the destruction of productive assets and basic infrastructure. As market access is often affected by road blockages and numerous checkpoints, maintaining adequate supplies of Produce is one of the major challenges facing market traders. According to Hassan et al (2020), Cattle producers are unsure when they will be able to safely access markets as a result of cattle market attacks. Cattle marketers have largely stopped or scaled back their operations as a result of the insurgency, and market participants face a number of constraints. These include restrictions on the supply of and access to cattle markets, an increase in taxation and fees, a decrease in the number of traders and producers, and a general decrease in the consumption of cattle and its products as a result of household economic constraints. Cattle is a major contributor to the economy and livelihoods of a large population in the study area, accounting for more than 75 percent of daily food subsistence, either directly or indirectly.

5.6.3 Schools in Vulnerable Zone

Figure 12: Schools in Vulnerable Zone map

Figure 12 shows schools within the vulnerable zones in the north east. From the image, schools in Borno state are facing the highest vulnerability to insurgent attacks, especially schools situated around the Borno, Adamawa state boundary as well as schools found in the heart of Maiduguri, Gwoza, Konduga and Chibok areas. Schools in some other locations like in Gombe and Yobe states also fall within the high vulnerability zones. According to UNDP report on assessing the Impact of Conflict on Development in North-East Nigeria schools are frequently destroyed or closed as a result of war, making it difficult or impossible for children to attend (UNDP, 2021). Displaced children frequently lack access to education as their families flee the war. Even children who have not been displaced may stop attending school due to the risk of abduction, to assist the household in surviving a shock, or to avoid being attacked or harmed when leaving the house. While some conflicts cause significant reductions in population education, the evidence is mixed, and education effects may be most visible at the local level even as national trends improve

5.6.4 Settlement in Vulnerable zones

Figure 13: Settlement in vulnerable zone map

Figure 13 shows the settlements that fall within the vulnerable zones. Again, Borno state records the highest number of highly vulnerable spots that falls within human settlement.

The vulnerable zones cover a total of 55477.75sqm which transcends three states with a number of towns heavily affected. Towns like Gwoza, Chibok, Gombi, Mubi north and south, Michika, Bama, Biu, Maiduguri city, Madagali, Koduga, and a few others.

5.6.5 Infrastructures in vulnerable zones

Figure 14: Utilities within vulnerable zone map

Figure 14 shows the distribution of three critical infrastructures (roads, railway and electricity transmission lines) across north-eastern Nigeria and the degree of vulnerability of occurrence of terrorists attacks. From the image, the areas marked in red colour are areas with high vulnerability and are concentrated in Borno state, followed by Yobe State and Adamawa. The activities of insurgency which has spanned over a period of 11 years has impacted on the socio-economic well-being of the region. Damage on electricity transmission lines has left most of the high vulnerable areas without access to power supply for a very long time, which has impressed on the economic activities in that area. Also, attacks on roads and railway infrastructure has impeded the free movement of people, goods and services, highlighting inter-state and trans-border migration in the northeast and neighboring nations of Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroon. Attacks by insurgents disrupted traffic, turning interstate and transnational roadways into highways of terror and destruction. Insurgents targeted vehicles, commuters, security officers, and regular citizens in their attacks. This made vehicle travel dangerous, with negative socioeconomic consequences for the region and neighboring countries.

5.6.6 Cropland within the vulnerable region

Figure 15: Cropland within the vulnerable region Map

Figure 15 shows that, the majority of cropland in Borno state falls within the high vulnerable areas which make them to be susceptible to attack by insurgence, however the remaining states of Adamawa, Taraba, Gombe, Yobe and Bauchi states that majority of the cropland falls in low vulnerable regions and little falls high vulnerable areas.


Nigeria has been beclouded with a myriad of security issues that has threatened us at every front with regards to its critical infrastructure across the nation, in particular at the North East Region. The easy access to timely, accurate information across federal, state and local political jurisdiction is capable to ensuring a fundamental base to decisions that would serve as critical support to the security agencies. Thus, the generation of real-time information for quick visualization of activity patterns of insurgency activities, particularly its impact on the nation’s critical infrastructure, its map locations and the clear understanding of multi-layered geospatial context of emergency situations would be of great aid to security operations and protections of critical infrastructure within the North East.

Therefore, the trend at geospatial information is advancing is of great advantage to provide the decision makers the needed requisite information to confidently confront a wide variety of threats to the critical infrastructure ravaging the North Eastern Region of Nigeria. However, the current employment of this technology, across all the federal, state, and local agencies and jurisdictions necessary to fully coordinate an effective response, is seriously lacking in specific areas. It is hoped that as the security agencies becomes infused into their daily operations in the protection of critical infrastructure, decision makers will greatly profit from the crisis management “edge” that GIS provides. The research recommends that leaders in the security sector would understand and implement the policy changes necessary to fully realize this technology’s capability, and make the management decisions necessary to implement it on a national basis.

Majority of the reviewed literature further reveals that such employed of a statistical, qualitative as its methodological approach in assessing the severity (vulnerability) of critical infrastructure of the selected study locations. In addition, the above studies did not succinctly describe the vulnerable critical infrastructures in the study area; their location, accessibility to these infrastructures (access), detailed information on vulnerable critical infrastructures. Thus, this paper aims to explore the role that Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and remote sensing can play in the assessing the vulnerability of the critical infrastructure in the North Eastern Region of Nigeria. This is of great benefit as there has not been much utilization of such methodological approach, in not only determining the severity of critical infrastructure within the region but furthermore,  serve as an indicator to security forces and agencies in identifying critical infrastructures that could have a correlation with insecurity issues within the north east region of the country. It is upon these premises that this research is being carried out. This is of great benefit as there has not been much utilization of such in assisting the security forces and agencies in combating insecurity in particular terrorism within the north east region of the country. The expected outcome of this project will include a classified image showing different land use and land cover along with accuracy reporting.

The advance in space science and technology presents numerous possibilities to be benefitted as a nation and indeed a continent as a whole. The proposal adopts the use hotspot analysis, KDE and overlay analysis in identifying vulnerable areas of critical infrastructure within the North Eastern Region of Nigeria. Although a desk review was conducted with the use of secondary materials largely sourced from government publications, academic journals and media reports, the research employed the use of various datasets derived from GRID3, ACLED datasets analysis and interpretation. Thus, the results gathered suggest strategic ways in addressing security of critical infrastructure for socioeconomic development. This would be useful to decision makers in the country to further facilitate conversations as regards enacting laws and regulations across the various tiers of governance as concerning Space Based Systems and Technology, in particularly to its application and significant to the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure across the nation.



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